

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 9 MBFR VIENNA 0135

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: AD HOC GROUP MEETING
OF 1 JULY 1974

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE AHG, UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF
UK REP (ROSE), SPENT MOST OF ITS ALL-DAY JULY 1
MEETING ADDRESSING AN ANALYTICAL PAPER ON THE
DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES, WHICH THE US PROPOSED
AS AN AHG SUBMISSION TO THE NAC. THE NETHERLANDS, UK AND
ITALIAN REPS EXPRESSED TENTATIVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT USING
RE-DEFINED GROUND FORCE MATERIAL WITH THE EAST PRIOR
TO THE SUMMER RECESS. THE AHG DECIDED TO FORWARD
THE PAPER TO NAC, WITH A COVER NOTE WHICH WOULD
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INFORM THE COUNCIL OF AHG REQUIREMENTS AND THE AHG INTENTION

TO MAKE AN INTERIM RESPONSE TO SOVIET CRITICISMS, AND WHICH WOULD REQUEST COUNCIL GUIDANCE FOR THE NEXT ROUND. THE PAPER, TOGETHER WITH SEPARATE US PAPER ON TACTICS FOR USE OF RE-DEFINING GROUND FORCE MATERIAL, WILL BE DISCUSSED FURTHER AT NEXT AHG MEETING JULY 3.

2. NETHERLANDS REP REPORTED BILATERAL IN WHICH POLISH REP HINTED AT VARIATIONS CONCERNING PHASING AND THAT EASTERN "FIRST STEP" CUTS MIGHT BE TAKEN BY PERCENTAGES RATHER THAN FIGURES. AT ITS JULY 1 MEETING, THE AHG HEARD UK REP'S COMMENTS ON HIS JUNE 28 REPORT TO THE NAC, FURTHER REVIEWED THE TALKING POINTS FOR THE JULY 2 INFORMAL SESSION, AND HAD A BRIEF EXCHANGE ON POSSIBLE USE OF SUMMING UP STATEMENTS AT THE END OF INFORMAL SESSIONS WITH THE EAST. END SUMMARY.

BILATERALS

3. THE NETHERLANDS REP (QUARLES) REPORTED ON A LUNCHEON HE HAD WITH POLISH REP STRULAK AND US REP. STRULAK HAD HINTED THAT THE EAST MAY HAVE CONCESSIONS TO OFFER ON PHASING IN EXCHANGE FOR WIDENING THE SCOPE OF THE PRESENT INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS AND BROADENING THE SCOPE OF INITIAL WESTERN REDUCTIONS. AN AGREEMENT LIMITED TO US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE PROVIDED THE FRG AND PERHAPS POLAND JOINED. STRULAK SUGGESTED THAT THE US AND USSR MIGHT TAKE CUTS GREATER THAN 20,000; HOWEVER, THIS WAS A MATTER FOR NEGOTIATION. MOREOVER, SUCH INITIAL CUTS COULD BE IN PERCENTAGES, RATHER THAN FIGURES; (NETHERLANDS REP NOTED THAT SOVIET DEPREP SMIRNOVSKY HAD MADE SIMILAR COMMENTS LAST WEEK). NETHERLANDS REP QUESTIONED STRULAK ABOUT THE PROPOSED EASTERN FIRST STEP, INCLUDING ITS ALLEGED NON-PREJUDICIAL EFFECTS ON SUBSEQUENT AGREEMENTS. AS EASTERN FIRST STEP AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO DRAW ON EITHER THE EASTERN OR WESTERN PLANS, QUARLES CONTENDED THAT A FIRST STEP WOULD SET A PATTERN. STRULAK ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THIS MIGHT BE TRUE BUT STATED THAT THE FIRST
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STEP IS LIMITED IN CHARACTER AND THUS WOULD NOT BE CONNECTED WITH OTHER STEPS TO FOLLOW. MOREOVER, STRULAK UNDERLINED THE PACT'S WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS NUMBERS AND THE SIZE OF THE SLICES PARTIES WOULD TAKE. STRULAK WAS UNABLE TO SAY HOW THE WARSAW PACT'S PROPOSED CUTS COULD FAIL TO RESULT IN NATIONAL SUB-CEILINGS.

4. IN AMPLIFICATION OF QUARLES' REPORT, US DEPREP

NOTED THAT STRULAK HAD EMPHASIZED THAT THE PACT WAS FLEXIBLE AS TO THE NUMBERS IN THE FIRST STEP AND THAT SUCH NUMBERS COULD BE UNEQUAL.

JUNE 28 AHG BRIEFING OF THE NAC

5. UK REP (ROSE) REPORTED ON HIS JUNE 28 ORAL PRESENTATION TO THE NAC ON BEHALF OF THE AHG. HIS REPORT CLOSELY PARALLELED THAT IN USNATO 3628. THE UK REP NOTED THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REMARK THAT, WITH THE MINISTERIALS COMPLETED, THE NAC WOULD HAVE MORE TIME TO SPEND ON MBFR; THE UK REP SAID THIS REMARK WAS GREETED WITH SOME SKEPTICISM BY THE COUNCIL.

6. THE UK REP SAID THAT IT WAS AGREED THAT THE NEXT REPORT TO THE NAC WOULD BE ON JULY 26. FRG REP (BEHREND), WHO ACCOMPANIED ROSE TO BRUSSELS, STATED THAT THE GROUPS' WEEKLY REPORTS WERE EVIDENTLY AN IMPORTANT MEANS OF CONVEYING INFORMATION TO SOME MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL; THEREFORE, THEY SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE SHORT AND CONCISE. THE UK REP AGREED BUT EMPHASIZED THAT FULL SUPPLEMENTARY REPORTS ALSO WERE REQUIRED. THE AHG AGREED THAT THE BELGIAN REP, ACCOMPANIED BY THE REPS OF LUXEMBOURG AND ITALY, WOULD GIVE THE NEXT AHG ORAL BRIEFING TO THE NAC.

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 9 MBFR VIENNA 0135

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

DRAFT TALKING POINTS FOR JULY 2 INFORMAL

7. THE TALKING POINTS FOR THE JULY 2 INFORMAL SESSION WERE GIVEN A FINAL REVIEW, WITH DISCUSSION FOCUSING ON HOW BEST TO PREPARE THE WAY FOR USE OF THE "ALL PARTICIPANTS" FORMULA. THE UK REP SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE THIS HAD YET BEEN DONE AND THE AHG FRIST SHOULD OBTAIN EASTERN RESPONSES TO AMBASSADOR RESOR'S QUESTIONS AT THE JUNE 25 INFORMAL (PARA 55, MBFR VIENNA 0114). UK REP WONDERED IF THE TALKING POINTS SHOULD SPELL OUT THOSE FOUR QUESTIONS.

8. US REP NOTED THAT AT THE PREVIOUS AHG
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DISCUSSION OF THE TALKING POINTS, THE GROUP FELT THERE WAS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD OF MOVEMENT FROM THE EAST PENDING THE OUTCOME OF THE SUMMIT. US REP ADDED THAT ALLIES NEEDED TO BE CAREFUL THAT CONTINUED EMPHASIS ON THE FOUR QUESTIONS DID NOT SIGNAL THAT THE WESTERN POSITION WOULD BE DIFFERENT IF THESE QUESTIONS WERE ANSWERED; IN FACT, IT WOULD NOT BE. THE EAST HAD ALREADY STATED THAT IT WOULD CLARIFY ITS POSITION WITH RESPECT TO THE FIRST STEP IF THE WEST AGREED TO EXPAND THE TOPIC OF DISCUSSION. ALL THAT NEED BE DONE AT THE END OF THE TALKING POINTS IS TO REMIND THE EAST THAT THE QUESTIONS REMAIN UNANSWERED. THE UK REP SAID HE WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE TALKING POINTS. IF WESTERN REPS ARE ASKED TO EXPLAIN THE QUESTIONS, THEY SHOULD NOT HESITATE TO REPEAT THEM. THE US REP SAID THAT HE HOPED JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE OF WHAT WAS NECESSARY BEFORE THE "ALL" FORMULA COULD BE PRESENTED WOULD BE RESERVED UNTIL AFTER BOTH THE SUMMIT AND THE JULY 2 INFORMAL. THE FRG REP AGREED, BUT ADDED THAT, IF THE OCCASION AROSE, WESTERN REPS SHOULD REPEAT THE QUESTIONS. THE TALKING POINTS WERE THEN APPROVED WITHOUT CHANGE.

DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES-GENERAL DISCUSSION

9. UK REP, AS CHAIRMAN, RECALLED THAT THERE WERE TWO US PAPERS BEFORE THE AHG ON DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES: ONE ANALYTICAL AND THE OTHER TACTICAL. (PARA 7, MBFR VIENNA 0128). WHILE BEARING IN MIND THE PAPER ON TACTICS, HE SUGGESTED THAT THE CURRENT DISCUSSION FOCUS ON THE ANALYTICAL PAPER.

10. US REP LED OFF THE DISCUSSION BY EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE THE WEST ATTACHED TO THE FOCUS ON GROUND FORCES AND THE ALLIED REFUSAL TO TALK ABOUT OTHER FORCES. THE EAST HAD CRITICIZED THE ALLIED DEFINITIONS AS BEING SLANTED IN FAVOR OF THE WEST BECAUSE OF ANOMALIES IN THE CATEGORIZATION OF GROUND FORCES. IT WAS ADVERSE TO WESTERN INTERESTS TO REFUSE TO CORRECT BIASES OR ANSWER REASONABLE EASTERN QUESTIONS BEFORE THE END OF THIS ROUND. IF THE WEST FAILED TO
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DEFEND THE BONA FIDES OF ITS POSITION, THE EAST COULD LEGITIMATELY WONDER WHETHER THE WEST WAS NEGOTIATING IN GOOD FAITH AND WAS SERIOUS ABOUT ITS FOCUS ON GROUND FORCES. MOREOVER, A DIALOGUE ON THE SUBJECT OF GROUND FORCE DEFINITIONS COULD PROVIDE FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE EASTERN VIEWS CONCERNING AIR MANPOWER.

11. UK REP SAID THAT THERE WERE TWO SEPARATE QUESTIONS: (1) ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS; (2) HOW TO HANDLE THE PROBLEM TACTICALLY AND WHAT THE TIME SPAN WAS. HE NOTED THAT THE MBFR WORKING GROUP (WG) IN BRUSSELS WAS WORKING ON A DETAILED PAPER ON DATA AND THAT IT WOULD BE CONVENIENT TO SET BEFORE THAT WG A GENERAL ANALYTICAL PAPER FOR REFERENCE. THUS, HE SUGGESTED THAT THE AHG TRY TO SEND THE ANALYTICAL PAPER TO BRUSSELS BY THE END OF THE DAY (JULY 1) AND HOLD THE TACTICS PAPER FOR CONSIDERATION AT THE JULY 3 AHG MEETING.

12. NETHERLANDS REP (QUARLES) SAID HE APPRECIATED THE EFFORT TO SEPARATE THE PROBLEM INTO TWO PARTS, BUT FELT THAT THE TWO ASPECTS WERE INTIMATELY RELATED. QUARLES VOICED DOUBT THAT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE SUMMER RECESS. IF THE ISSUE WERE ADDRESSED, OTHER ISSUES PUT TO THE SPC MIGHT BE PREJUDICED. FOR EXAMPLE, THE QUESTION OF WHETHER AIR MANPOWER SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE COMMON CEILING HAS AN IMPORTANT BEARING ON DEFINITIONS. NETHERLANDS REP WAS DOUBTFUL REGARDING THE SUGGESTION, MADE IN

THE ANALYTICAL PAPER, THAT DISCUSSION OF GROUND FORCE DEFINITIONS COULD DRAW THE EAST INTO DISCUSSION OF THE COMMON CEILING. QUARLES ALSO WAS WORRIED THAT THE WEST COULD BE GIVING AWAY A 30,000-MAN SLICE WITHOUT GETTING ANYTHING IN RETURN. DECISIONS SHOULD NOT BE MADE WITHOUT FULL KNOWLEDGE OF ALL THE ELEMENTS.

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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 9 MBFR VIENNA 0135

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

13. THE NETHERLANDS REP THEN NOTED THAT THE WEST HAD BEEN REPEATEDLY ATTACKED ON ITS CONCEPT OF PARITY. POINTING TO PACT SUPERIORITY IN GROUND MANPOWER AND TANKS, QUARLES DISPUTED STRULAK'S STATEMENT THAT THERE WAS GENERAL PARITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE WEST WAS HAMPERED BY THE FACT THAT SECDEF SCHLESINGER HAD SAID THERE IS PARITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE. CONSEQUENTLY, SAID QUARLES,

IT WAS HARD TO PRESS FOR GROUND FORCE PARITY, AND THE WEST COULD ONLY DO SO IN EXCHANGE FOR OPTION 3. TO GET WHAT THE WEST WANTS IN PHASE I (ELIMINATION OF DISPARITIES), THE WEST SHOULD INTRODUCE OPTION 3 EARLY IN THE AUTUMN SESSION.

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14. NETHERLANDS REP THEREFORE ASKED WHY THE WEST NOW SHOULD REDUCE ITS DEMANDS. A COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCES WOULD NOT BE BOUGHT BY CONCESSIONS ON DEFINITIONS. IN DISCUSSING DEFINITIONS THE WEST WOULD BE PLANTING THE IDEA THAT IT MAY BE WILLING TO MAKE THE COMMON CEILING STILL MORE ATTRACTIVE LATER. THE ONLY THING REALLY NEEDED NOW WAS TO EXPRESS WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS CONSTRUCTIVELY THE DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES AT A TIME WHEN THE EAST ALSO IS READY TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT CONSTRUCTIVELY AND TO PUT ITS DATA ON THE TABLE. IN SUM, THE WEST WANTS TO DISCUSS THE COMMON CEILING, NOT GET IT OUT OF THE WAY. ACCORDINGLY, A DISCUSSION OF FORCE DEFINITIONS SHOULD BE IN THE CONTEXT OF A DISCUSSION OF FINAL OUTCOMES.

15. NETHERLANDS REP MAINTAINED THAT IF THE WEST CONTINUES TO MAKE THE COMMON CEILING MORE ATTRACTIVE BY REDUCING THE GAP, IT WOULD BE GIVING AWAY OPTION 3 FOR NOTHING SUBSTANTIAL IN RETURN. HE DOUBTED THE NEED TO ADDRESS THE FORCE DEFINITION ISSUE BEFORE THE SUMMER RECESS, SINCE THE WEST HAD NOT YET PLAYED THE "ALL" FORMULA. PRESUMEDLY, THIS WOULD BE DONE IN THE JULY 9 INFORMAL. AFTER THAT, THERE WOULD BE ONLY ONE REMAINING INFORMAL SESSION, WHICH THE ALLIES WOULD WANT TO USE FOR A SUMMING UP. THIS, THEREFORE, IS NOT THE TIME TO INTRODUCE A COMPLEX SUBJECT LIKE THE DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES. THUS, THERE WAS NO TIME PRESSURE ON THE WEST.

16. ITALIAN REP (CAGIATI) SAID HE WAS INCLINED TO AGREE WITH AMBASSADOR RESOR THAT THE WEST WAS IN AN AWKWARD POSITION; HOWEVER, HE ALSO UNDERSTOOD THE NETHERLANDS REP'S POINTS. ITALIAN REP THEN SUGGESTED THAT THE SCOPE OF THE INITIATIVE BE REDUCED. THAT IS, THE ALLIES COULD IN AN INFORMAL SESSION DEFINE THE FORCE CATEGORIES WITHOUT DISCUSSING WHAT ELEMENTS ARE IN OR OUT OF THEM, AND WITHOUT DISCUSSING DATA. THIS WOULD PREPARE THE GROUND BY INDICATING THAT THE WEST IS WILLING TO CLARIFY THE ISSUES FURTHER WHEN BOTH SIDES PRODUCE PROPER DATA.

17. US REP SAID THAT THE IMPORTANT THING WAS TO
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GIVE A CLEAR MESSAGE TO EAST. THE WEST ALREADY HAS SAID IT IS WILLING TO DISCUSS THE GROUND FORCE DEFINITION. IF THE WEST DOES NOT BECOME MORE SPECIFIC NOW, THE SOVIETS WILL NOT PERCEIVE A SIGNIFICANT ALLIED OFFER. IN RESPONSE TO QUARLES COMMENTS US REP SAID, THE ALLIES SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT GAP IS NOT DWINDLING. IT HAD RISEN FROM AN ORIGINAL 32,000 TO THE PRESENT FIGURE OF 161,000. THE ISSUE WAS HOW TO CONVINCE THE OTHER SIDE TO TAKE ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS WITH GAPS OF THAT MAGNITUDE. THE TASK ASSIGNED TO OPTION 3 COULD BE EASED IF THE SUGGESTED GROUND FORCE DEFINITION APPROACH ALSO WAS EMPLOYED. WHILE RE-DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES WILL NOT BUY THE COMMON CEILING, IT COULD HELP BUY REASONABLE ASYMMETRICAL CUTS AND LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR OPTION 3. MOREOVER, SAID US REP, RE-DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES IS NOT PREJUDICIAL TO A POSSIBLE SUBSEQUENT DECISION TO INCLUDE AIR MANPOWER. IF THE EAST PRESSES FOR INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER AFTER A GROUND FORCE DEFINITION DISCUSSION, THE WEST WOULD STILL BE ABLE TO RESPOND AFFIRMATIVELY IF NATO HAD SO DECIDED.

18. FRG REP UNDERLINED THE WESTERN GOAL OF REDUCING EASTERN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE FORM OF A TANK ARMY, WHILE EXCLUDING AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES. THE WEST CANNOT PUT OFF DISCUSSION OF THE COMMON CEILING UNTIL TOO LATE, AND WILL NEED TO DEFEND IT FAIRLY SOON. SINCE THE NEXT TOPIC IN THE INFORMALS WILL BE THE SHAPE OF REDUCTIONS, A DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES WOULD BE USEFUL TO LEAD INTO THIS DISCUSSION. WESTERN CATEGORIES BASED ON UNIFORM WERE SOMEWHAT DUBIOUS AND UNFAIR. CONSEQUENTLY, THE FRG REP FAVORED INTRODUCING THE DEFINITION ISSUE, BUT HAD SOME DOUBTS WHETHER THIS WOULD BE POSSIBLE BEFORE THE RECESS. HE AGREED WITH THE US REP THAT SUCH INTRODUCTION WOULD NOT PREJUDICE THE INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER. FRG REP SAID BONN HAD DOUBTS WHETHER AIR MANPOWER INCLUSION IS WISE. HE DID, HOWEVER, BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT TO GET AN AGREEMENT ON A PRECISE DEFINITIONAL MODEL FOR GROUND FORCES.

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S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 9 MBFR VIENNA 0135

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

19. CANADIAN REP (GRANDE) AGREED IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE WEST COULD SOMEWHAT REDUCE THE GAP. WHILE IT MIGHT NOT BE POSSIBLE TO MOVE THINGS AS QUICKLY AS SOME WOULD LIKE AND WHILE HE HAD SOME DOUBTS ABOUT PUTTING FORWARD THE ISSUE BEFORE THE RECESS, HE FELT THE AHG SHOULD TRY TO MAKE THIS DEADLINE. HOWEVER, IT WAS NOT ESSENTIAL TO GET AN AHG REPORT TO THE MBFR WG BY JULY 2.

20. UK REP THOUGHT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL FOR AHG TO POINT OUT TO THE WG THE VULNERABILITY OF THE WESTERN DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES. UK REP NOTED THAT THE PROBLEM HAS MANY IMPLICATIONS AND THAT GOVERNMENTS WILL NOT WANT TO BE RUSHED IN MAKING DECISIONS. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE GROUP FIRST TACKLE THE ANALYTICAL
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PAPER, WHICH WOULD PRODUCE AN AGREED APPRECIATION OF THE PROBLEM AND WOULD PROVIDE A STARTING POINT FOR DIFFICULT DISCUSSIONS IN BRUSSELS. ONCE THE ANALYTICAL PAPER IS SENT TO NATO, THE AHG CAN FACE THE ISSUES OF SHORT TERM TACTICS. UK REP SAID LONDON FELT THERE WAS A

NEED TO SAY SOMETHING ON GROUND FORCE DEFINITIONS IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE CREDIBILITY OF THE WESTERN NEGOTIATING POSITION, PARTICULARLY IF THE WEST IS TO PROCEED IN THE AUTUMN TO A DISCUSSION OF THE COMMON CEILING AND OF DATA BASES. THE WEST SHOULD SUGGEST A WILLINGNESS TO LOOK AGAIN AT DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS WITHOUT BEING SPECIFIC AS TO WHAT IT MIGHT ACCEPT. CONSEQUENTLY, IT IS POSSIBLE TO SEPARATE LONGER TERM NEEDS FROM SHORT TERM TACTICS. AT THE VERY LEAST, THE ANALYTICAL PAPER SHOULD BE AVAILABLE TO THE SPC FOR ITS JULY 5 MEETING.

21. THE NETHERLANDS REP SAID HE COULD SUPPORT THE SEPARATION INTO LONGER TERM ISSUES AND TACTICAL ISSUES PROPOSED BY THE UK REP, BUT ADDED THAT THE DISCUSSION HAD STRENGTHENED HIS BELIEF THAT THE PROBLEM WAS A DEEP AND COMPLICATED ONE, AND THAT IT WAS UNWISE TO DEAL WITH THE IMPLICATIONS HASTILY OR TO DEAL IN ANY FINAL WAY WITH THE ISSUE AT THE FINAL INFORMAL OF THIS SESSION; RATHER, IT SHOULD BE GONE INTO IN DETAIL IN EARLY AUTUMN. NETHERLANDS REP SUGGESTED THAT THE WEST NONETHELESS GIVE THE EAST A SIGNAL ON DEFINITIONS, CONTINGENT ON EASTERN WILLINGNESS TO MOVE FORWARD, IN THE PRESENT SESSION.

22. US REP INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO FOLLOW THE GENERAL LINE SUGGESTED. WHILE IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO MAKE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS TO EAST NOW, HE FELT THE WEST SHOULD GIVE A CLEAR SIGNAL IN THE PRESENT SESSION BEYOND A MERE WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE WHICH ALLIES HAD ALREADY INDICATED TO EAST. SINCE THE WEST HAS ALREADY INDICATED ITS WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE, TO REITERATE NO MORE THAN THIS POSITION COULD COMPOUND AN EASTERN IMPRESSION OF WESTERN BAD FAITH. THE WEST SHOULD SHOW A WILLINGNESS TO BE FLEXIBLE ON THE ISSUE. THE AHG AGREED TO TRY TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE ANALYTICAL PAPER BY THE END OF JULY 1, IN ORDER TO SEND A PAPER TO BRUSSELS THAT EVENING.

DETAILED DISCUSSION OF ANALYTICAL PAPER

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23. IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS BY ITALIAN AND UK REPS REGARDING FIGURES USED IN THREE CHARTS ATTACHED TO THE PAPER, US REP SAID A FEW WERE US ESTIMATES AND OTHERS WERE EXTRACTED FROM THE MBFR WORKING GROUP DATA PACKAGE. THE LATTER FIGURES WERE EXPECTED TO BE FINALIZED SOON; THEY WOULD BE CONSIDERED AT THE JULY 2 MBFR WG MEETING AT NATO. UK REP NOTED THAT THE DIFFERENCES IN THE OUTSTANDING FIGURES WERE RATHER SMALL. THE AHG AGREED TO EXAMINE THE CHARTS CAREFULLY AFTER AGREEING ON THE ANALYTICAL PAPER.

24. IN THE INTRODUCTORY SECTION OF THE PAPER, AHG AGREED, AT REQUEST OF UK, FRG AND NETHERLANDS REPS, TO ADD A PARAGRAPH TO THE INTRODUCTION REFERRING TO THE ISSUE OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER, NOTING THAT THIS SUBJECT HAD BEEN RAISED WITH THE NAC BY THE AHG.

25. AHG THEN CONSIDERED THE "NEGOTIATING BACK-GROUND" SECTION OF THE PAPER. UK REP SUGGESTED THAT A GENERAL REFERENCE TO THE ANOMALY IN AIR DEFENSES OF THE WARSAW PACT BE MADE IN LIEU OF SINGLING OUT POLISH AND CZECH AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL. US DEPREP SAID THE PROBLEM WAS TO MAKE AS CLEAR A PRESENTATION AS POSSIBLE AND THE CENTRAL ISSUE WAS THAT POLES AND CZECHS WERE BEING COUNTED IN A MANNER DIFFERENT THAN THOSE OF THEIR WESTERN COUNTERPARTS. TO FRG REP'S QUERY ABOUT US AND SOVIET AIR DEFENSE FORCES, US REP SAID THESE WERE NOT ANOMALOUS. UK REP POSED THE PROBLEM AS TO WHETHER WP AIR DEFENSE FORCES IN THE ARMY WERE AN ANOMALY OR WHETHER ONLY POLISH AND CZECH AIR DEFENSE FORCES WERE AN ANOMALY. IT WAS THEN AGREED TO INCLUDE A REFERENCE TO US AND SOVIET AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL, IN ADDITION TO THE POLISH AND CZECH PERSONNEL.

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

26. IN DISCUSSING THE POSSIBLE MOTIVES OF THE SOVIET REP IN RAISING THE ISSUE OF GROUND FORCE ANOMALIES, THE ITALIAN REP SUGGESTED THAT KHLESTOV MIGHT BE ADVANCING THE ANOMALIES IN ORDER TO REDUCE THE DISPARITIES OR GAP BETWEEN THE GROUND FORCES. SOVIET REP MIGHT BE INTERESTED IN SHOWING THE PUBLIC THAT THE GAP BETWEEN EAST AND WEST WAS, IN FACT, FAIRLY SMALL. US DEPREP AGREED THAT ONE SOVIET MOTIVE MIGHT WELL BE TO SHOW THAT THE WEST HAD EXAGGERATED THE SIZE OF THE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE GROUND FORCES ON EACH SIDE. THIS POINT WAS ADDED TO THE PAPER.

27. THE SECTION ON "IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ALLIED NEGOTIATING TACTICS" WAS THEN DISCUSSED. ITALIAN REP EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE PAPER MIGHT BE SUGGESTING THAT THE EAST WAS LIKELY TO MAKE CONCESSIONS IF THE
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WEST MADE ITS GROUND FORCE DEFINITIONS MORE LOGICAL. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT LIMITED CHANGES WOULD PRODUCE ANY CONCESSIONS FROM THE EAST, AND URGED THAT THE PAPER SHOULD NOT CONVEY OPTIMISM. UK REP SUGGESTED THAT THE PAPER BE MODIFIED TO SUGGEST THAT THE AHG WAS ONLY HOPING FOR SOME CORRESPONDING EASTERN MOVEMENT. NETHERLANDS REP AGAIN WARNED THAT THE WEST WOULD BE MAKING CONSIDERABLE CHANGES IN FORCE RATIOS BY REDEFINITION AND ARGUED THAT SUCH CHANGES SHOULD ONLY BE MADE AS PART OF A LARGER NEGOTIATING CONTEXT DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE THE COMMON CEILING. THE WEST "SHOULD NOT JUST GIVE AWAY 30,000 MEN". US DEPREP SAID THE ISSUE WAS INDEED THE EFFORT TO BRING PACT TO DISCUSS COMMON CEILING SERIOUSLY. ITALIAN REP REITERATED THAT THE AHG SHOULD NOT CREATE AN IMPRESSION IN BRUSSELS THAT THE WEST WILL GET MUCH IN RETURN FOR THIS SMALL MOVE; IF THE RESULTS ARE NOT WHAT WAS AIMED FOR, THE WEST LOOKS FOOLISH. UK REP AGREED THAT THE AHG SHOULD NOT OVERPLAY ITS HAND IN REPORTING TO THE COUNCIL. THE AHG, HOWEVER, WAS NOT TALKING OF TACTICS HERE; RATHER IT WAS ADDRESSING WHAT USE MIGHT BE MADE OF THE CHANGES. IT WAS NECESSARY TO SELL THE ISSUE TO THE NAC; THEREFORE, IT WAS APPROPRIATE TO SUGGEST A POSSIBLE EASTERN RETURN MOVE. US REP NOTED THAT WESTERN WILLINGNESS TO REDEFINE GROUND FORCES COULD BE MADE DEPENDENT ON EASTERN CONCESSIONS. THE UK REP SAID THAT DISCUSSION OF SUCH

CONCESSIONS SHOULD BE RESERVED FOR A SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION OF TACTICS.

28. AHG NEXT CONSIDERED THE POSSIBLE TIMING OF A WESTERN PRESENTATION. NETHERLANDS REP ARGUED THAT IT WAS INCORRECT TO SAY THAT FORCE CATEGORIES SHOULD BE ADDRESSED BECAUSE OTHER TOPICS MIGHT BE EXHAUSTED. US DEP REP AGREED THAT A REFERENCE TO A SPECIFIC TIME COULD BE ELIMINATED; NEVERTHELESS, IT WAS NECESSARY TO EMPHASIZE THE AHG'S NEED TO PREPARE FOR THE FUTURE. US REP SAID THAT IT WAS LIKELY THAT BY EARLY AUTUMN THE SUBJECT OF PHASING WOULD BE EXHAUSTED. IT WOULD THEN BE NECESSARY TO MOVE ON TO THE SHAPE OF REDUCTIONS, SINCE IT WAS UNLIKELY THAT ANY COMPLETELY DEFINITIVE AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE BEEN REACHED YET ON PHASING. NETHER-
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LANDS REP REPEATED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO THINK THROUGH THE IMPLICATIONS OF CATEGORIZATION AND THERE WAS NO NEED TO RUSH INTO DISCUSSION OF DEFINITIONS. UK REP SAID THAT THE PARAGRAPH IN QUESTION WAS NOT INTENDED TO BRING A DECISION BEFORE THE AUTUMN.

29. A DISCUSSION ENSUED ON WHETHER IT WAS NECESSARY TO POINT OUT TO THE NAC THE IMPLICATIONS FOR WESTERN NEGOTIATING CREDIBILITY IF DATA ANOMALIES WERE NOT ADDRESSED. UK REP SUGGESTED IT WAS UNNECESSARY. US REP ARGUED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO BRING HOME TO THE NAC THAT IF THE AHG FAILS TO RAISE THE ISSUE, IT RISKS IMPAIRING WESTERN NEGOTIATING CREDIBILITY. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE WEST WAS NOT LISTENING TO THE EAST AND WAS NOT SERIOUS ABOUT ITS FOCUS ON GROUND FORCES. MOREOVER, THERE WAS A RISK THAT THE EAST MIGHT GO PUBLIC WITH THE ANOMALIES. NETHERLANDS REP RESPONDED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT TO ANSWER THE EAST PUBLICLY. IF THE ISSUE AROSE, HE COULD AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE NOTE THE WESTERN WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE WITH THE EAST ONCE THE EAST PRODUCED DATA (WHICH IT HADN'T DONE). IN ANY CASE, PUBLICITY WOULD NOT ADD TO THE URGENCY FOR NAC DECISION. US REP SAID THE EAST MIGHT GO PUBLIC SUBSEQUENT TO QUARLES' PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE END OF THIS SESSION, THEREBY PRECLUDING A TIMELY WESTERN REPLY.

30. THE NETHERLANDS REP INQUIRED WHETHER THE AHG WOULD BE SUGGESTING NEW DEFINITIONS AND WHETHER SUBSTANTIVE GUIDANCE WOULD BE REQUESTED FROM THE NAC. US REP REPLIED THAT THE AHG SHOULD GO AS FAR AS THE ITALIAN REP SUGGESTED, AND THAT SUBSTANTIVE GUIDANCE

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P R 040850Z JUL 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0250

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 6 OF 9 MBFR VIENNA 0135

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

WOULD BE NEEDED BY THE AUTUMN. NETHERLANDS REP RE-
TORTED THAT THE NAC WILL NOT KNOW WHAT THE AHG DESIRES,
AND MIGHT THINK THAT A DECISION WAS NEEDED REGARDING
CASE I AND CASE II. ITALIAN REP SUGGESTED THAT THE
AHG SHOULD INDICATE WHAT IS WANTED FROM THE NAC AT
END OF THE MESSAGE. US DEPREP STRESSED THAT THE AHG
COULD GET GENERAL GUIDANCE FROM THE NAC ON A DEFINITIVE SOLUTION
OF THE ISSUE MEANWHILE, THE

AHG COULD GIVE A HINT TO THE EAST. NETHERLANDS
REP AGAIN ASKED WHETHER THE AHG WAS SEEKING AN IN-
STRUCTION. US DEP REP SAID THAT THIS ISSUE COULD BE
ADDRESSED AT THE END OF THE PAPER, THAT
THE TIME FACTOR WAS NOT BEING ADDRESSED, AND THAT AHG

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WAS TRYING TO TELL THE NAC IN THE PRESENT PAPER THAT THE ISSUE NEEDED TO BE ADDRESSED SERIOUSLY. US DEPREP CONTINUED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO POINT OUT TO THE NAC THAT THE WESTERN POSITION IS NOT AUTOMATICALLY CREDIBLE AND THAT THE WESTERN FUND OF CONFIDENCE WAS BEING UNDERMINED. IT WAS AGREED TO INCLUDE THE CREDIBILITY ISSUE IN THE PAPER.

31. THE BELGIAN REP ADRIAENSSEN SPOKE UP FOR THE FIRST TIME, STATING THAT HE FAILED TO UNDERSTAND WHAT THE AHG INTENDED IN DISCUSSING THIS ISSUE. IF IT INTENDED TO GIVE A HINT, AS THE ITALIAN REP SUGGESTED, NAC GUIDANCE WAS UNNECESSARY. THE REAL ISSUE WAS WHETHER THIS MOVE SHOULD BE MADE SEPARATELY OR IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE COMMON CEILING. EACH DELEGATION COULD EXPRESS ITS OWN VIEWS TO THE NAC. THE PAPER, HE MAINTAINED, SHOULD BE ADDRESSED SLOWLY AND CAREFULLY. UK REP DID NOT AGREE THAT THE AHG COULD ACT ON THIS MATTER WITHOUT COUNCIL APPROVAL. HE NOTED THAT, IN HIS JUNE 25 ORAL PRESENTATION TO THE NAC, HE HAD PROMISED A PAPER ON THE SUBJECT. WHEN A MAJOR PROBLEM IS TO BE ADDRESSED IN NATO, THERE IS AN ADVANTAGE TO HAVING AN AGREED AHG ANALYTICAL PAPER ON THE SUBJECT. UK REP THEN SUGGESTED THAT THE PAPER MIGHT NEED A COVERING NOTE SAYING THAT THE PAPER WAS AN AHG ANALYSIS OF A PROBLEM WHICH WILL HAVE TO BE ADDRESSED. TACTICS WOULD BE ADDRESSED SEPARATELY. US REP CONCURRED WITH THIS PROPOSAL.

32. NETHERLANDS REP NOTED THAT THE PAPER HAD BOTH TOO AMBITIOUS A SCOPE AND TOO LIMITED A VISION WITH RESPECT TO THE COMMON CEILING. WHAT WAS NEEDED, WAS A PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSION OF FINAL OUTCOMES. DISCUSSION OF CATEGORIES SHOULD BE IN A BROADER CONTEXT. CATEGORIZATION OF FORCES WAS NOT A USEFUL WAY TO GET INTO A DISCUSSION OF PARITY AND BALANCE. ACCORDINGLY, THE PAPER SHOULD BE LIMITED STRICTLY TO A DISCUSSION OF CATEGORIES.

33. FOLLOWING A RECESS FOR LUNCH, AHG RETURNED TO DISCUSSION OF THE ANALYTICAL PAPER. ITALIAN REP.

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REFERRED TO THE TWO POSSIBLE WAYS SET FORTH IN THE

PAPER FOR MODIFYING THE PRESENT ALLIED DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES. (CASE I CONTEMPLATES EXCLUSION OF POLISH AND CZECH NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL FROM THE GROUND FORCES, WHILE CASE II CONTEMPLATES EXCLUSION OF ALL AREA AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL ON BOTH SIDES. BOTH WOULD ADD SOVIET HELICOPTER PERSONNEL SUPPORTING GROUND FORCE UNITS TO THE PACT GROUND FORCE TOTAL.) ITALIAN REP SUGGESTED THAT GROUP DISCUSS THE TWO CASES PROPOSED, WITH A VIEW TO SELECTING THE PREFERRED CASE, AND THEN RECAST THE PAPER TO SUPPORT THAT CASE. ITALIAN REP. SAID THAT SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD ALLOW FOR A SHORTER PRESENTATION AND WOULD AVOID THE IMPRESSION OF PASSING THE BUCK TO THE COUNCIL. BELGIAN REP. AGREED WITH THIS APPROACH.

34. UK REP SAID HE COULD NOT ACCEPT SUCH AN APPROACH. HE SAID THERE ARE MANY OTHER POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE DEFINITIONS THAT COULD BE DEVELOPED, WHICH WERE NOT DESCRIBED IN THIS PAPER, AND ALL ALTERNATIVES HAVE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS. THE ULTIMATE DEFINITION SELECTED WOULD HAVE A GREAT EFFECT ON SELECTED WOULD HAVE A GREAT EFFECT ON THE WESTERN NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL AND UK REP WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO SELECT AND PUT FORTH A SCHEME WHICH HAD NOT BEEN REVIEWED BY UK MILITARY AUTHORITIES. WHILE THE TWO CASES IN THE PAPER WERE ATTRACTIVE FROM A TACTICAL POINT OF VIEW, THEY NEEDED CAREFUL FURTHER ANALYSIS BEFORE A SELECTION BETWEEN THEM COULD BE MADE.

35. ITALIAN REP THEN ASKED THAT IF THIS WERE THE CASE, HOW THE AHG HAD COMPETENCE TO NARROW THE RANGE TO ONLY TWO CASES; WHY NOT PRESENT ALL POSSIBILITIES? THE GROUP CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS PREMATURE TO SELECT A PARTICULAR CASE AND SETTLED ON LANGUAGE SAYING THAT THE TWO CASES SET FORTH HAD BEEN SELECTED AS THE BEST ONES FOR TACTICAL REQUIREMENTS.

36. UK REP NEXT POINTED OUT WHAT HE FELT WAS A POTENTIAL PROBLEM WITH EXCLUDING POLISH AND CZECH

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NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL FROM THE PACT GROUND FORCE TOTALS. SINCE THESE PERSONNEL WERE USED FOR HOME DEFENSE PURPOSES, THEY PROBABLY WOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN ANY REDUCTION PACKAGE DEVELOPED BY THE EAST AND WOULD, THUS, STILL BE PART OF THE PACT GROUND FORCES REMAINING AFTER REDUCTION TO A COMMON CEILING. UK REP. SAID THAT, BY EXCLUDING THESE

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

PERSONNEL FROM THE PACT TOTALS, THE WEST WOULD IN
ESSENCE, BE MAKING ROOM FOR AN ADDITIONAL 41,000
"COMBAT" TROOPS WITHIN THE PACT FORCES UNDER THE
COMMON CEILING.

37. US REP. RESPONDED THAT, IN DEVELOPING ANY
FORCE REDUCTION PLAN, COMPETING ELEMENTS WITHIN THE
FORCE STRUCTURE WOULD PROBABLY ENSURE THAT EACH TYPE
OF FORCE WOULD SHARE IN THE ULTIMATE REDUCTIONS. NO
ONE PARTICULAR TYPE OF FORCE WOULD BE SACROSANCT.
THUS, IT WAS NOT REASONABLE TO EXPECT THAT THE POLISH
AND CZECH NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE FORCES WOULD ESCAPE
REDUCTIONS. ITALIAN REP. ADDED THAT BY TAKING SOME
FORCES AWAY FROM THE PACT TOTAL, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE
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TO KEEP THE PRESENTLY ENVISIONED CEILING OF 700,000. BUT, IF THE FORCE TOTALS CONTINUE TO RISE, IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO RAISE THE LEVEL OF THE PROPOSED COMMON CEILING.

38. FRG REP. REFERRED TO PAPER'S TREATMENT OF WEST GERMAN PERSHING PERSONNEL, AND PERSONALLY AGREED WITH PAPER'S RECOMMENDATION THAT ALLIES SHOULD STUDY THIS ANOMALY TO BE PREPARED FOR FURTHER EASTERN INITIATIVES REGARDING INCLUSION OF THESE PERSHING PERSONNEL IN NATO'S GROUND FORCE TOTAL. HOWEVER, FRG REP HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS TOPIC AND DID NOT LIKE THE THOUGHT OF HAVING TO LUMP AIR FORCE UNITS IN WITH OTHER GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS AS THIS WOULD CREATE ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS FOR THE FRG. IN ANY EVENT, FRG REP SAID SUCH A STEP WOULD DEPEND HEAVILY ON WHAT PROGRESS THE ALLIES HAD MADE WITH THE OTHER GROUND FORCE DEFINITION STEPS. IF THESE STEPS WERE NOT SUCCESSFUL, IT MIGHT NOT BE NECESSARY TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF THE FRG PERSONNEL. HE SUGGESTED, AND THE GROUP AGREED, THAT THE PAPER POINT OUT ONLY THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD ADDRESS THE PROBLEM "AT SOME FUTURE TIME."

39. UK REP. THEN STATED THAT THE FIRST CASE ADVANCED IN THE PAPER (EXCLUSION OF POLISH AND CZECH NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL) COULD BE SEEN BY THE EAST AS A SIGNAL THAT THE WEST WAS WILLING TO ACCEPT A DISTINCTION BETWEEN FOREIGN AND NATIONAL FORCES, AT LEAST FOR THE CATEGORY IN QUESTION. A POSSIBLE ARGUMENT AGAINST CASE 1 IS THAT IT MAKES THIS DISTINCTION AND THUS COULD BE USED BY THE EAST AS A PRECEDENT TO GET WEST TO MAKE OTHER SUCH DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN FOREIGN AND NATIONAL FORCES. THIS MUST BE RESISTED. UK REP POINTED OUT THAT THE SECOND CASE, WHICH INCLUDED SOME BELGIAN AND UK AIR DEFENSE FORCES WOULD NOT RAISE THIS PROBLEM.

40. THE GROUP THEN ADDRESSED THE PORTION OF THE PAPER DESCRIBING THE ALTERNATIVE OF OFFERING BOTH CASES 1 AND 2 TO THE PACT ON THE THEORY THAT THE ALLIES COULD
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IN THIS MANNER OBTAIN EASTERN REACTIONS WITHOUT HAVING COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO EITHER CASE IN ADVANCE.

ITALIAN REP SAID THIS SUGGESTION DEALT WITH A TACTICAL APPROACH TO THE USE OF CASES, AND SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN THE ANALYTICAL PAPER AS A TRUE ALTERNATIVE. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE THOUGHT BE MOVED TO THE TACTICS PAPER. UK REP AGREED THAT THIS ALTERNATIVE DID NOT BELONG IN THE ANALYTICAL PAPER AND SAID THAT HE DID NOT LIKE THIS APPROACH AT ALL. UK REP SAID THE GROUP WAS CONSIDERING PUTTING FORWARD SERIOUS DEFINITIONAL CASES, ONE OR THE OTHER OF WHICH WOULD PROVE TO BE MORE SATISFACTORY FROM A MILITARY AND POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW. HE ARGUED THAT A DECISION AS TO WHICH WOULD PROVE BETTER WAS A MATTER WHICH MUST BE ADDRESSED WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, AS OPPOSED TO BEING SELECTED BY THE WARSAW PACT. US DEPREP REPLIED THAT THE SELECTION OF ALTERNATIVES SHOULD BE MADE ON THE BASIS OF BOTH MILITARY AND TACTICAL ASSESSMENTS IN THE OVERALL CONTEXT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. US DEPREP SAID THAT THE US DEL COULD REWORK THE PARAGRAPH FOR SUBSEQUENT INCLUSION IN THE TACTICS PAPER. FRG REP INTERVENED, STATING HIS STRONG WISH THAT THIS ALTERNATIVE BE DROPPED ENTIRELY. HE POINTED OUT THAT ONCE THE PACT HAD EXPRESSED A PREFERENCE FOR ONE OR THE OTHER OF THE CASES, THE WEST WOULD BE HARD PRESSED TO SHIFT THE FOCUS TO THE OTHER CASE, IF THAT PROVED MORE DESIRABLE. AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE, STRONG CONSENSUS DEVELOPED IN THE GROUP TO DROP THE ABOVE ALTERNATIVE FROM EITHER THE TACTICS OR THE ANALYTICAL PAPER AND US REP AGREED TO DO SO.

41. THE CHAIRMAN THEN SUGGESTED, IN VIEW OF THE EXTENSIVE REVISIONS WHICH HAD BEEN MADE, THAT THE US DEL PREPARE A REDRAFT OF THE PAPER FOR FINAL CONSIDERATION BY THE AHG MEETING ON 3 JULY. IN HIS CAPACITY AS UK REP, HE CIRCULATED A PROPOSED COVER NOTE TO PROVIDE FOR FORWARDING THE FINAL PAPER TO THE NAC AND SUGGESTED THAT THE AHG CONSIDER THE COVER NOTE ON JULY3. CANADIAN REP ASKED WHETHER THE AHG INTENDED TO ASK THE NAC FOR GUIDANCE ON INTERIM TACTICS. THE AHG AGREED THAT THE APPROACH WOULD BE TO
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INFORM THE NAC OF THE INTERIM TACTICS IT INTENDED AND NOT TO ASK FOR INSTRUCTIONS IN THIS REGARD.

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

42. NETHERLANDS REP SUPPORTED THIS DECISION, POINTING OUT THAT IT ALSO WAS ADVISABLE TO INDICATE TO THE NAC SOME ADVICE AS TO THE LONG TERM DISPOSITION OF THE AHG ANALYTICAL PAPER, OTHERWISE THE NAC MIGHT NOT ACT ON IT. ONCE THE GROUP HAD ADVANCED THE PAPER, IT SHOULD ASK ADVICE ON ITS ULTIMATE USE, AS IT DEALT WITH IMPORTANT PROBLEMS.

43. FRG REP SAID HE STILL FELT THE PAPER WAS SLANTED TOWARDS THE FIRST CASE AND THAT THE TWO CASES SHOULD BE PRESENTED MORE OBJECTIVELY. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE FIRST CASE MIGHT PROVIDE THE EAST WITH AN OPPORTUNITY TO ASK FOR OTHER DEFINITIONAL CONCESSIONS, SINCE THE LOGIC FOR THE CASE, EXCLUDING ONLY POLISH AND CZECH NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL, ONLY ADDRESSED
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PART OF THE PROBLEM. THE SECOND CASE, WHICH WOULD

EXCLUDE ALL AREA AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL PROVIDED MORE OF A DEFENCE AGAINST DURTHER DEMANDS BY THE EAST BECAUSE IT APPLIED THE SAME FUNCTIONAL CRITERIA TO ALL FORCES. FRG REP CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT USE OF THE FIRST CASE MIGHT LEAD TO EASTERN ATTEMPTS TO COMPLETELY REMOVE THE DISPARITY THROUGH SUCCESSIVE MANIPULATIONS OF DATA. AHG AGREED TO POINT OUT IN THE PAPER THAT THE DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES IN CASE 2 APPLIED THE SAME FUNCTIONAL CRITERIA TO ALL FORCES IN THE AREA. HOWEVER, THE GROUP DID NOT AGREE THAT THE EAST COULD EFFECTIVELY ACT TO DRAW DOWN THE DISPARITY IN THE WAY FEARED BY FRG REP, ACCEPTING US REP'S REASONING THAT THIS COULD NOT OCCUR WITHOUT THE ACQUIESCENCE OF THE ALLIES, WHO WOULD NOT ACCEPT OTHER THAN OBJECTIVE CRITERIA.

44. US REP CALLED ON US DELOFF (CLARKE) TO REVIEW PACT NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE SITUATION. CLARKE POINTED OUT THAT THE CURRENT ALLIED DIVISION OF POLISH AND CZECH NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE FORCE PERSONNEL BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR FORCES WAS A CONSTRUCTIVE ATTEMPT TO DEAL WITH A FORCE STRUCTURE THAT HAD NO COUNTERPART IN THE WEST. THE FORCES HAD BEEN DIVIDED BASED ON CERTAIN FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH WESTERN FORCES. THERE WAS AN ANOMALY, AND THE EAST HAD CALLED ALLIES ON IT. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE EAST HAD NOT RAISED THE QUESTION OF OTHER AIR DEFENSE FORCES, BUT RATHER, ONLY THE POLISH AND CZECH NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE FORCES. US REP THEN CONTINUED, SAYING THAT THE OBJECTIVE WAS TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE EAST THE WEST'S FLEXIBILITY AND FAIRNESS. PERHAPS THE EAST WOULD IDENTIFY OTHER AREAS IN WHICH THEY FELT THE DEFINITIONS WERE ANOMALOUS. IN THIS MANNER, IF THE POINTS RAISED BY THE EAST WERE SUSTAINABLE OBJECTIVELY THE EAST COULD BE DRAWN INTO MEANINGFUL DISCUSSION OF DATA, AND ULTIMATELY, BE LED TO DISCUSSION OF THE COMMON CEILING.

45. US REP SAID THAT IT WOULD NOT BE DESIRABLE TO GO TOO FAR IN THIS REGARD. HE ADDED IT WOULD BE BEST TO STICK INITIALLY TO THE POINT THAT THE EAST HAD

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REPEATEDLY RAISED, THE QUESTION OF POLISH AND CZECH NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL. THESE PERSONNEL CONSTITUTED AN ESSENTIALLY "NEUTER" SERVICE, LEAVING ROOM FOR INTERPRETATIONS. US REP CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT, IN HIS OWN VIEW, IT WOULD NOT BE USEFUL TO START BY OFFERING TO EXCLUDE PERSONNEL WHO ARE CLEARLY IN THE GROUND FORCES, AS THE SECOND CASE DID. THIS CASE MIGHT BE HELD FOR A FALLBACK POSITION.

46. NETHERLANDS REP REITERATED HIS CONCERNS OVER THE DANGER OF PLAYING A FIGURES GAME WITH THE POTENTIAL FOR FRITTERING AWAY THE ENTIRE GROUND FORCE DISPARITY. HE STATED THAT THE EAST MIGHT THINK THAT THE WEST WAS TRYING TO FIND ITS WAY OUT OF A DIFFICULT PROBLEM AND ATTEMPT TO CAPITALIZE ON THIS SITUATION. US REP SUGGESTED PAPER MIGHT CONTAIN LANGUAGE COVERING THIS POINT.

PROPOSED SUMMARY FOR 2 JULY INFORMAL MEETING

47. US DEP REP NEXT CIRCULATED A SUMMARY OF EASTERN AND WESTERN POSITIONS, WHICH HE PROPOSED BE USED DURING THE JULY 3 INFORMAL MEETING WITH EASTERN REPS. HE SAID THE SUMMARY COULD SERVE TWO PURPOSES. THE FIRST WOULD BE TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR EVENTUAL USE OF THE "ALL PARTICIPANTS" FORMULA ONCE APPROVED BY THE NAC. THE SECOND PURPOSE WOULD BE TO ACCUSTOM THE EASTERN REPS TO THE IDEA OF SUMMING UP THE SITUATION AT APPROPRIATE TIMES. IT MIGHT PROVE NECESSARY AGAIN TO SUMMARIZE AT AN OPPORTUNE TIME SHORTLY AFTER THE SUMMER RECESS, AND TO TAKE A PROFILE OF THE EASTERN AND WESTERN POSITIONS ON THE PHASING ISSUE AT THAT TIME FOR FURTHER USE. IF THIS WERE DONE WITHOUT PROPER PREPARATION, THE EASTERN REPS MIGHT BE SUSPICIOUS AS TO WEST'S INTENT, AND THE RESULTS SUFFER CORRESPONDINGLY. US DEPREP STATED THAT A PREVIOUS SUMMARY COULD PROVE USEFUL AS A PLATFORM FOR THE ALLIES TO TABLE THE "ALL PARTICIPANTS" *94.7)-.

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

48. BELGIAN REP STATED THAT THE US DEL PAPER WAS AN EXCELLENT SUMMARY OF THE TWO SIDES' CURRENT POSITIONS, AND THAT THE IDEA OF GETTING THE EASTERN REPS TO ACCEPT PERIODIC SUMMARIES DURING THE INFORMALS WAS SOUND. HE FELT, HOWEVER, THAT THE TIME WAS NOT OPPORTUNE. HE SAID THAT THERE WAS A DANGER IN TAKING A SNAPSHOT OF POSITION AT THIS PARTICULAR MOMENT DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS, AS SOME POINTS MAY STAND OUT MORE THAN OTHERS. FOR ESAMPLE, THE PRECONDITION OF ACCEPTANCE BY THE EAST OF THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE EMPHASIZED SUFFICIENTLY IN THE PROPOSED SUMMARY. FURTHER, BELGIUM REP SAID THE GROUP SHOULD CONSIDER OTHER EVENTS OCCURING OUTSIDE VIENNA, SUCH AS THE US/ SOVIET SUMMIT. AND WAIT UNTIL AFTER THIS WAS OVER PRIOR TO
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USING THE PAPER.

49. NETHERLANDS REP SUGGESTED THAT, RAHTER THAN PROVIDING SUCH A SUMMARY DURING THE 2 JULY INFORMAL, IT MIGHT BE BETTER TO TAKE SUCH A STEP DURING THE FINAL INFORMAL MEETING OF THIS ROUND OF THE TALKS. US DEPREP AGAIN POINTED OUT THAT THE OBJECTIVE WAS NOT ONLY TO HABITUATE THE EASTERN REPS TO PERIODIC SUMMING UP OF STATUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT IT ALSO SEEMED DESIRABLE TO SET THE STAGE FOR INTRODUCTION OF THE "ALL PARTICIPANTS" FORMULA. THE WEST CANNOT RELY ON THE EASTERN REPS TO PROVIDE AN APPROPRIATE OPENING IN THE NEXT TWO INFORMAL MEETINGS. IF THE WEST PREPARED THE GROUND BY COMPARING THE TWO SIDE'S POSITIONS, WESTERN REPS COULD REFER TO EASTERN AGREEMENT ON THE STATUS OF THESE POSITIONS IN ADVANCING THE NEW FORMULA. HOWEVER, IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO USE THIS APPROACH IN THE NEXT INFORMAL.

GROUP AGREED TO RETURN TO TOPIC WHEN PREPARING FOR A
LATER INFORMAL.

50. NEXT AHG MEETING WAS SET FOR JULY 3. RESOR

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Message Attributes

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Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
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Film Number: D740178-0881
From: MBFR VIENNA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
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Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
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Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 19 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <19 MAR 2002 by izenbei0>; APPROVED <09 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: AD HOC GROUP MEETING OF 1 JULY 1974
TAGS: PARM, NATO
To: STATE DOD
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005